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title: Advisory - Recent Reporting on Influence Operations - October2026
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What Recent Reporting Shows About Influence Operations Ahead of the Midterms ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­    ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­  

| View in browser ADVISORY TLP:CLEAR October 15, 2026 TL;DR The Threat: Recent reporting shows coordinated efforts to spread false or misleading information about the election to U.S. audiences using social media, influencers, fake personas, AI content, and fraudulent websites that layer campaigns and lend credibility to one another. Immediate Action: Share your office’s official website and communication channels, verify accounts, watch for lookalike domains, and preplan your response to fake or misleading content appearing. Broader Risk: Current activity aims to shape voter perceptions of the election environment, not directly target U.S. election infrastructure. Common Approaches These tactics are not new, but efforts to spread false and misleading information are growing more sophisticated as actors stack multiple media to create more realistic content. Social Media: The people behind these efforts use fraudulent, bot, or hacked accounts to seed content, which other inauthentic accounts then amplify. Fake personas or influencers: They create accounts that pose as  activists, experts, journalists, or citizens to build individualized backstories. These accounts often interact with real users before spreading misleading narratives to appear more legitimate. When these accounts are developed in bulk, they can give the illusion of a large following. Artificial Intelligence (AI): This technology makes it easier, cheaper, and faster to create realistic content, tailor messages, generate synthetic media, and pivot tactics quickly. Fake websites: Fraudulent sites can mix real content with malicious claims, serving as sources to cite on social media and giving the content the appearance of legitimacy. For example: Website address swaps: A real domain paired with the wrong ending (e.g., \[dot\]org or \[dot\]co instead of \[dot\]gov) Typosquatting: Lookalike or misspelled URLS designed to mimic the real thing (e.g., localjurisdcition\[dot\]org) Fake local news websites: Invented websites (e.g., “Washington Explorer”, “Albuquerque Express”) that mix scraped content with fabricated stories to simulate legitimate local sources  These sites fool readers. They also manipulate search engines and AI tools that voters consult for information on polling locations, voting deadlines, or unofficial results. As a result, voters may be unsure about which election information to trust.  What Happened Recent reporting indicates Russia- and Iran-linked influence operations are reaching U.S. audiences using familiar tactics from prior election cycles. Armenia's June 2026 parliamentary election likely served as a testing ground, showing how these tactics can be combined to spread inauthentic content.   The New York Times (NYT), Meta, and other sources describe components of the common approaches election officials may see. A recent Microsoft report also notes that foreign adversaries are increasingly adapting their techniques as they gradually integrate their operations (e.g., cyber, information, and military) to align strategic messaging and maximize impact. Modern influence campaigns often combine social media, artificial intelligence, and a supporting network of websites and accounts to give the content credibility. This advisory explains how these threads connect and work together to capitalize on divisive narratives and sow further distrust in U.S. elections.   While viral deepfakes draw attention, they are rarely standalone events. Influence actors depend just as much on the quieter infrastructure that supports those narratives, including the websites election officials manage. Your website is often your most direct channel to voters, which makes it a target.    Key findings from the reporting include: The NYT reports, according to classified assessments shared by an anonymous source, that Russia has authorized an influence campaign to amplify division among the U.S. electorate. There is no evidence from the source that suggests it’ll directly target election infrastructure. According to Meta’s second half (H2) adversarial threat report, foreign networks leveraged personas to engage with U.S. followers on politics and eventually posted AI-generated content. Recorded Future flagged the same activity, reporting that Iran used “sophisticated fake personas” on Instagram to build relationships with U.S. users before introducing political messaging. Recorded Future also found that AI has expanded Iranian actors' capabilities, including the use of fake personas and AI-generated content meant to inflame disagreements among Americans over ongoing operations in the Middle East.   A U.S. based organization has also documented and tracked influence campaigns and tactics that converged on the Armenian election in June 2026, highlighting it as a potential testbed for the U.S. midterm election. The entity noted that the operations used a variety of tactics, including creating videos impersonating many individuals, cloning the voices of actors and other celebrities, and using brand logos without permission. This also included the use of multiple platforms and distribution methods, such as paid influencers, fake local news outlets, and fake or hacked social media accounts to amplify content. Why This Matters The sophistication and layers of modern influence campaigns reinforce false narratives and are increasingly challenging to detect. Fabricated content can target not only individuals but also search engines, AI-enabled systems, and legitimate users, spreading misleading or inaccurate narratives to undermine U.S. elections. As AI improves, synthetic content is shifting from obviously inaccurate content to pairing real videos or other media with cloned audio to create the appearance of legitimacy and authenticity. Credibility is now built in layers: social media provides reach, personas add legitimacy, AI makes content look authentic, and websites serve as sources. Countering one layer alone may no longer be enough, because the other layers remain to prop up the false information.   What To Do Now Election officials can reduce potential exposure and partially inoculate against influence campaigns with a few steps: Make your website and social media accounts easy to find and verify accounts where applicable. Link your website and social accounts, and when possible after the election, migrate to a .gov domain (free through CISA’s get.gov). Get ahead of potential false or inaccurate narratives now by teaching voters where accurate information lives. Be ready for impersonation of your office or election workers by pre-coordinating initial steps, who has authority to make decisions in response, and knowing when you should respond. Prepare a short holding statement to quickly respond if something surfaces that’s false or misleading. Pause and Take9 seconds before engaging or sharing any content. Monitor for lookalike sites by searching for common misspellings or swapping out the top-level domains (e.g., yourjurisdiction\[dot\]gov to yourjurisdiction\[dot\]net) If you can, procure those “lookalike” sites so that no one else can purchase them. Verify unfamiliar sources you don’t recognize before sharing or responding. Resources Election Security Exchange: Newsletter Situation Room - Spoofed Celebrity Videos Target the Midterms (September 2026) Election Security Exchange: Advisory - Vigilance Against Social Engineering and Impersonation (August 2026) Election Security Exchange: Newsletter Resource Library - Can You Trust What You’re Seeing? Tools for Your AI Toolbelt (July 2026) Take9: 9 Seconds for a Safer World ASU AI+Elections Clinic and Ready for Tuesday: Don’t Fall for the AI Fake Sources New York Times: Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections, U.S. Intelligence Finds (September 026) Meta: Adversarial Threat Report (August 2026) Microsoft: Decoding emergence - 2026 Microsoft Digital Defense Report (Fall 2026) Institute for Strategic Dialogue: All operations on Armenia: Russia’s influence machine targets the vote (May 2026) Recorded Future: Iranian influence operations using fake personas to deceive US Instagram users disrupted, Meta says (March 2026) Recorded Future: AI Has Enhanced Iran’s Asymmetric Playbook During the 2026 Conflict (July 2026) Analysis drawn from threat reporting conducted by an American, non-partisan research institution.   Copyright © 2026 Election Security Exchange. All rights reserved. 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